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WHY RENT CONTROL IS A REGULATORY
TAKING
R.S. RADFORD*
'he Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause provides that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation."' Exactly what comprises a "taking" of property has been, and
remains, a subject of intense controversy.2 Since 1987, the United
States Supreme Court has reviewed property regulations challenged
under the Takings Clause on thirteen occasions,3 significantly
strengthening constitutional protections for the rights of property
owners.
A wide variety of regulations may be threatened by the stringent
new constitutional standards established by the Supreme Court's re-
cent takings jurisprudence. One clear example is rent control, which
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has never been subjected to a rigorous regulatory takings challenge
under the Court's current ground rules.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the evolution of the
Supreme Court's regulatory takings doctrine, which holds that govern-
mental restrictions on the use of private property can so attenuate
individual rights as to violate the Takings Clause unless the owner is
compensated. Part II reviews the Supreme Court's record in passing
on the constitutionality of rent control and demonstrates that no
peacetime rent ordinance has ever been upheld against a regulatory
takings claim. Part III examines two recent cases in which the New
York Court of Appeals applied the regulatory takings doctrine to
strike down rental property regulations. Part IV reviews recent em-
pirical studies of rent control in California and Massachusetts, which
demonstrate the failure of these regulations to meet the Supreme
Court's current constitutional standards. Finally, this Article con-
cludes that rent control laws will need to meet increasingly stringent
standards to survive constitutional scrutiny under the criteria set forth
in recent Supreme Court rulings.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE
A. Early Formulations: From Pennsylvania Coal to Agins
It is an open question whether the Framers of the Fifth Amendment
contemplated that government could take private property for public
use by excessive regulation.4 Early cases brought under the Takings
Clause almost always dealt with either outright governmental seizures
of property or physical interference with the utility or accessibility of
land.5
Not only did Fifth Amendment takings claims initially focus on
physical expropriations, but until nearly the dawn of the twentieth
century it was not even possible to bring such actions against state and
local governments.6 Thus, nineteenth century cases such as Mugler v.
Kansas,7 frequently cited by advocates of regulation as bearing on reg-
ulatory takings law, were in fact litigated exclusively as violations of
the Due Process Clause.8 It was not until thirty-five years after
Mugler that the Supreme Court devised an alternative doctrine by
4. See, e.g., Joseph M. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41
YALE L.J. 221, 225 (1931) ("[D]uring the early development of the law of this country
a purely physical conception of the process of condemnation was amply sufficient.").
5. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (flooding); Richards
v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914) (smoke damage).
6. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause was held to apply to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi-
cago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
7. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
8. See, e.g., LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES: A HANDBOOK ON THE
LEGAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 7-9 (Elaine Moss ed., 1977).
which local property regulations could be struck down under the Tak-
ings Clause.
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,9 the Supreme Court first ac-
knowledged that government regulation can infringe upon the rights
of private property owners in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Tak-
ings Clause. Justice Holmes eloquently voiced the Court's new stan-
dard: "[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."'10 Unfortu-
nately, property owners were in for a long wait before the Court
would elaborate on how to determine if a regulation "goes too far."
More than half a century after Pennsylvania Coal, in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York," the Supreme Court finally
set forth a number of factors to determine whether a regulatory mea-
sure effects a taking of property. Prominent among these factors were
the "character of the governmental action" and the "economic impact
of the regulation."' 2
These considerations were brought into sharper focus in Agins v.
City of Tiburon.3 In Agins, the two-part Penn Central inquiry was
recast in terms of whether the challenged measure: (1) substantially
advances legitimate state interests, or; (2) denies the owner economi-
cally viable use of the land.14 This two-pronged test has been reiter-
ated by the Supreme Court in every major regulatory takings decision
since Agins. Despite the gradual refinement of the Court's terminol-
ogy since Pennsylvania Coal, however, Agins' dual criteria were stated
at a level of generality that left the Court ample room for further doc-
trinal maneuvering.
B. The Per Se Rules
In a decision that can best be described as a doctrinal detour, the
Supreme Court temporarily set aside the two-part Agins test to an-
nounce a per se, or categorical, takings rule in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.15 In Loretto, Justice Marshall proclaimed
that regulations authorizing an uncompensated permanent physical
occupation of property invariably violated the Takings Clause. For
regulations of this class, the "character of the government action"
branch of the Penn Central analysis is determinative. 16
The rule set forth in Loretto was unique in that it had never previ-
ously been applied or articulated in any Supreme Court decision.
9. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
10. Id. at 415.
11. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
12. Id at 124.
13. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
14. Id at 260.
15. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
16. Id at 426.
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Loretto did not involve a direct physical invasion comparable to flood-
ing17 or intrusive overflights by aircraft. 8 Rather, the measure dis-
puted in Loretto was a regulatory enactment limiting the royalties
property owners could charge for the installation of cable television
fixtures on their apartment buildings.' 9 As such, there is no obvious
reason why the offending enactment could not have been brought
under one prong or the other of the Agins analysis. In any event, the
Supreme Court has never used the Loretto standard to strike down
regulations in subsequent cases.
In contrast to the apparent doctrinal arbitrariness of Loretto, the
Supreme Court announced a second per se rule in 1992, which flowed
directly from Agins' second prong. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,2 ° the South Carolina legislature, citing the value of open
beaches to the state's tourism industry, enacted the Beachfront Man-
agement Act,2' which prohibited the construction of any permanent
dwelling on petitioner David Lucas's property. Lucas did not dispute
the validity of the regulation, in effect stipulating that the Act substan-
tially advanced legitimate state interests.22 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court held that a regulatory taking results whenever "regulation de-
nies all economically beneficial or productive use of land. ' '23 The
Court did not extend this categorical rule to cases involving the loss of
only some viable uses of property, but indicated such claims would
continue to be analyzed under the general Agins paradigm. 4
C. The Substantial Advancement Standard
If Lucas demonstrated the viability of Agins' second prong as a
stand-alone test for regulatory takings, the Supreme Court's
equivalent first-prong decisions were Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission2 I and Dolan v. City of Tigard.6
1. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
In Nollan, a family applied for a permit to demolish their small
beach bungalow and replace it with a larger residence.2 7 The Califor-
17. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
18. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
19. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423-25. For an unusually clear explanation of the distinc-
tion between outright physical takings and physical occupations affected by regula-
tion, see Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 864 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th
Cir. 1989).
20. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
21. S.C. CODE Arm. §§ 48-39-10 to 360 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1993).
22. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900-02.
23. Id. at 2893 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (emphasis
added).
24. Id. at 2894 n.7.
25. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
26. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
27. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
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nia Coastal Commission agreed to issue a permit only if the Nollans
conveyed an easement granting public access across one-third of their
beachfront property.2" The Supreme Court struck down the permit
condition for failing to substantially advance legitimate state interests,
regardless of its impact on the economic viability of the property.29
Clearly, Nollan's call for heightened scrutiny of regulations chal-
lenged under the Takings Clause was its most significant addition to
the Court's regulatory takings doctrine. Since 1934, the Supreme
Court had accorded extreme deference to economic regulations chal-
lenged on due process grounds. 0 The general rule had been that such
regulations will survive constitutional scrutiny if they are rationally
related to their asserted purpose. At the extreme, the economic due
process standard required only that a hypothetical legislator might im-
agine that a given regulation had some "rational basis." 3'
Many jurists and commentators had assumed that the economic due
process standard was also the appropriate level of scrutiny for regula-
tory takings challenges 2.3  Nollan clearly dispelled this belief. Justice
Scalia's opinion effectively recast Agins' "substantial advancement"
test as a mandate for an elevated standard of judicial review under the
Takings Clause.33 The regulatory takings standard was expressly dis-
tinguished from the deferential scrutiny historically applied to due
process or equal protection cases.3 4 Nollan's substantial advancement
test demands that regulations serve legitimate purposes, and that
there be a close fit between a measure's objective and the means cho-
sen to implement it.35
2. Dolan v. City of Tigard
The Supreme Court's second application of Agins' "substantial ad-
vancement" standard came in Dolan v. City of Tigard.36 Dolan sug-
gested that a regulatory taking can occur even if the affected property
suffers no deprivation of economic use whatever.37 Nollan's height-
28. Id
29. Id. at 837.
30. The Supreme Court's deferential due process standard of review is generally
traced to Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
31. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
32. See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. "We have required that the regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate
state interest' sought to be achieved," Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.3 (citing Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)), "not that the State could rationally have decided
that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835
n.3 (citations & internal quotation marks omitted).
34. "[T]here is no reason to believe (and the language of our cases gives some
reason to disbelieve) that so long as the regulation of property is at issue the stan-
dards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal protection challenges
are identical." Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.3.
35. See id. at 834-37.
36. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) [hereinafter Dolan].
37. ld at 2316 n.6.
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ened scrutiny requirement was reaffirmed, and in fact, strengthened,
in Dolan. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist likened the standard of re-
view applicable to property regulations challenged under the Takings
Clause to that employed in cases arising under the First
Amendment.38
The Nollan Court left unanswered the question of how close a rela-
tionship must exist between regulatory measures and the mitigation of
harms that would otherwise be caused by the proposed use of prop-
erty. That question was answered in Dolan. Like Nollan, the Dolan
case involved conditions attached to the issuance of a building permit.
The condition required by the Coastal Commission in Nollan was
found to be completely unrelated to harms that might plausibly be
caused by the Nollans' proposed enlargement of their home.39 There-
fore, the challenged regulation was summarily struck down as "an out-
and-out plan of extortion."4
In Dolan, by contrast, the City of Tigard demanded mitigation of
drainage and congestion problems that bore some plausible relation-
ship to the Dolans' proposed expansion of their small plumbing busi-
ness.41 The City of Tigard had conducted extensive general studies of
the relationship between new construction and the need to mitigate
resulting congestion and storm drainage problems.42 The City had
even issued findings relating to the probable impact of the specific
development project at issue.43 However, the exactions imposed on
Mrs. Dolan were struck down because the City had not shown that the
expansion of her hardware store would impose a public burden
roughly proportional to the exaction of a public greenway. 4
The Oregon Supreme Court had upheld the City of Tigard's green-
way exaction because of the City's finding that:
"[T]he proposed expanded use of this site is anticipated to generate
additional vehicular traffic, thereby increasing congestion on nearby
collector and arterial streets. Creation of a convenient, safe pedes-
trian/bicycle pathway system as an alternative means of transporta-
tion could offset some of the traffic demand on these nearby streets
and lessen the increase in traffic congestion."
We are persuaded that the transportation needs of petitioners'
employees and customers and the increased traffic congestion that
will result from the development of petitioners' land do have an
essential nexus to the development of the site, and that this condi-
38. Id. at 2319-20.
39. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
40. Id. (citation omitted).
41. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
42. Id. at 2313-14.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2321.
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tion, therefore, is reasonably related to the impact of the expansion
of their business.45
Reversing the Oregon Supreme Court decision, the United States
Supreme Court established that such general findings of "reasonable
relationships" are inadequate to sustain property regulations against a
regulatory takings challenge. The Supreme Court indicated that con-
ditions imposed on property use must be supported by an individual-
ized determination that they are roughly proportional, both in nature
and extent, to the mitigation of public harms that would otherwise
result from the property's unregulated use. 6  Accordingly, the
Supreme Court held that the City had not shown a sufficiently close
nexus between the proposed land use and the required mitigation.47
The most dramatic element of the Dolan decision is that it expressly
shifts the burden of proof to local governments defending regulations
challenged under the Takings Clause.a8 Such a shift had been implicit
in Nollan's heightened scrutiny requirement,4 9 but moved to center
stage in Dolan. This development is a monumental setback for prop-
erty regulators, who have grown accustomed to having their actions
cloaked in a presumption of legitimacy. 0
3. The Substantial Advancement Standard Applies to Economic
Regulations
In an effort to evade the stringent requirements of the substantial
advancement standards, some regulatory "hawks" responded to Nol-
lan by mischaracterizing the decision as a "physical invasion" case,
rather than a regulatory takings case.5 l Although this argument was
flatly preposterous on its face,52 it was embraced by a number of Cali-
45. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 443 '(Or. 1993) [hereinafter Dolan II](footnote omitted) (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 22 Or. LUBA 617, 622) (Land
Use Board of Appeals) [hereinafter Dolan 1].
46. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
47. Id. at 2321.
48. Id. at 2320 n.8.
49. See R.S. Radford, Regulatory Takings Law in the,1990s: The Death of Rent
Control, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1019, 1027 (1992); Rigobirto V. Obregon & Rebekah Z.
Parker, Comment, Get It Right the First Time: A Message from the Supreme Court to
Land Use and Environmental Regulators-A Comment on Nollan and First English, 7
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. 173, 177-78 (1988).
50. See, e.g., Burton, Changing Presumption, supra note 2; Daniel R. Mandelker &
A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land- Use Law, 24
URB. LAW. 1 (1992).
51. See Neal Stout, Note, Making Room at the Inn: Rent Control as a Regulatory
Taking, 36 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNrEMP. L. 305, 312-13 (1990); Karl Manheim, Ten-
ant Eviction Protection and the Takings Clause, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 925, 947-50; Note,
Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 102 HARV. L. REV. 448, 465-68 (1988).
52. The facts and plain language of the opinion clearly distinguish Nollan from
physical invasion cases. As Justice Scalia noted in dicta, if the California Coastal
Commission had simply seized an easement across the Nollans' property, that would
1995]
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fornia appellate courts as a means to avoid applying heightened scru-
tiny to property regulations.53
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has put an end to these revisionist
efforts. On the next court day following the Dolan decision, the Court
expressly confirmed that the substantial advancement standard ap-
plies to regulations with solely monetary impacts. In Ehrlich v. City of
Culver City,54 the Supreme Court vacated a California appellate deci-
sion that upheld the imposition of two development fees and re-
manded with instructions to reconsider the case in light of Dolan.
Ehrlich's petition for certiorari urged the Court to affirm that Nollan's
heightened standard of review applies to regulatory takings in the
form of fees.55 By vacating and remanding for reconsideration under
the Dolan analysis, the Supreme Court eliminated any doubt that it
intended the heightened standards of Nollan and Dolan to apply to
regulations not involving a physical interference with land.
II. THE SUPREME COURT ON RENT CONTROL AND TAKINGS
The Supreme Court has not tested a rent control ordinance since its
rigorous regulatory takings standards were introduced in 1987. In
fact, the Court has reviewed takings challenges to peacetime rent reg-
ulations on only three occasions, 56 and has never sustained such meas-
ures against a regulatory takings claim.57
have amounted to a taking by physical occupation. Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987). But of course, that didn't happen; it was never
even proposed. The issue before the Court was the conditioning of a permit to coerce
the "voluntary" dedication of an easement.
As the Court pointed out in Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992), the
essence of a physical taking is the forced acquiescence in the occupation of one's
property by third parties. Id. at 1528. In contrast, the Nollans were free to go about
their business with no regulatory interference-so long as they did not attempt to
exercise their right to build on their own property. In short, Nollan involved "a regu-
latory restriction on use, as opposed to a direct governmental trespass on possession."
Frank I. Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence and Constitutional Property, in LIBERTY,
PROPERTY, & THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 127, 140 (Ellen Fran-
kel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990).
53. See Saad v. City of Berkeley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 95, 98-99 (Cal. App. 1 Dist.
1994); Tahoe Keys Property Owners' Ass'n v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d 734, 743-44 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 1994); Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 19
Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 475-76 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1993); City and County of San Francisco
v. Golden Gate Heights Inv., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 469-70 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1993);
Blue Jeans Equities West v. City and County of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114,
117-18 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1992).
54. 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
55. See 62 U.S.L.W. 3456 (Jan. 11, 1994) (regarding Ehrlich's petition for certiorari
to the Supreme Court filed on 11/24/93).
56. See Yee, 112 S. Ct. 1522; Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Chastle-
ton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
57. In Chastleton Corp., the rent law was found to be unconstitutional; in Pennell,
the takings question was not ripe for adjudication; and in Yee, the property owners
failed to raise the regulatory taking issue.
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The Supreme Court's first evaluation of rent control came in 1921,
in the context of emergency regulations imposed to overcome market
distortions during World War I. In Block v. Hirsh5" and Marcus
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman,59 a closely divided Court upheld rent
ordinances against facial challenges on due process and other grounds.
Justice Holmes carefully spelled out the Court's rationale:
[A] public exigency will justify the legislature in restricting property
rights in land to a certain extent without compensation .... The
regulation is put and justified only as a temporary measure. A limit
in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that
could not be upheld as a permanent change.60
The Supreme Court's first opportunity to pass on the validity of
rent control as other than a temporary wartime measure came in
Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair.6' In Chastleton, the Court struck down
the same District of Columbia regulation that had been upheld in
Block v. Hirsh when Congress attempted to extend it beyond the war-
time emergency. According to Justice Holmes, the "first and most im-
portant" issue in Chastleton was that "the emergency that justified
interference with ordinarily existing private rights.., had come to an
end in 1922,°and no longer could be applied consistently with the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution."62 Anticipating what would become
a politically popular rationale for rent control in the 1970s, Justice
Holmes went on to note that, if all that remained of the emergency
was inflated prices, "that is not, in itself, a justification of the act."63
Since these early cases, the Supreme Court has done virtually noth-
ing to elaborate on the applicability of the regulatory takings doctrine
to peacetime rent control.64 In strongly worded dissenting opinions,
three current Justices have expressed the view that the Court should
have applied the Takings Clause to strike down rent regulations, but
the majority of their colleagues have been unwilling to take up the
question.65
In Yee v. City of Escondido,66 the Supreme Court upheld a mobile
home rent control ordinance against a physical takings challenge
based on Loretto. As noted by Justice O'Connor, the applicable stan-
dard in such cases is whether the government "requires the landowner
58. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
59. 256 U.S. 170 (1921).
60. Block, 256 U.S. at 156-57 (citations omitted).
61. 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
62. Id. at 546.
63. Id. at 548.
64. Federal regulations applied during World War II survived a takings challenge
in Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
65. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (Scalia, J., joined by
O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Fresh Pond Shopping Center
v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
66. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
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to submit to the physical occupation of his land, 67 which was not the
situation in Yee. In that context, the Court rejected the petitioner's
argument that the effect of the regulation was contrary to its stated
purpose. However, the Court added that "[t]his effect might have
some bearing on whether the ordinance causes a regulatory taking, as
it may shed some light on whether there is a sufficient nexus between
the effect of the ordinance and the objectives it is supposed to
advance."'
This is, of course, a reference to the substantial advancement stan-
dard of Agins, Nollan and Dolan. The Court seemed eager to apply
this criterion to rent control,69 but was constrained because the prop-
erty owners had not raised the regulatory takings issue in the lower
courts.7 0
III. POST-NOLLAN TAKINGS CHALLENGES To NEw YORK RENT
REGULATIONS
The New York State Court of Appeals has used the Nollan and Do-
lan substantial advancement test to strike down rent regulations in
both facial and as-applied takings challenges. In Seawall Associates v.
City of New York,71 the Court of Appeals overturned a local ordi-
nance that prohibited the conversion or demolition of single room oc-
cupancy ("SRO") residential hotels. Five years later, in Manocherian
v. Lenox Hill Hospital,72 the Court of Appeals found a taking arising
from a state law that required indefinite lease renewals for residential
apartments rented by non-profit corporations.
A. Seawall Associates v. City of New York
Seawall involved a facial challenge to New York City's Local Law
No. 9, a regulation that established a five-year moratorium on the con-
version, alteration, or demolition of SRO housing, and required the
owners to restore all such units to habitable condition and to lease
them to others at controlled rents.73 Alternatively, the law allowed
owners to "buy out" of the regulations by paying a fee of $45,000 per
room to the City.74 The stated purpose of the ordinance was to allevi-
ate homelessness by increasing the availability of SRO housing.75 A
67. Id. at 1528.
68. Id. at 1530 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 1531.
70. Id.
71. 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
72. 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994).
73. Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1061-62.
74. Id. at 1061.
75. Id. at 1068.
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group of owners sued the City, arguing that, inter alia, Local Law No.
9 violated the Takings Clause on its face. 76
Adhering to Nollan, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the owners.77 Noting that "[t]he Nollan decision seems to
indicate that most regulations will now be subjected to a higher level
of scrutiny than that previously utilized in determining claims of regu-
latory takings,"7" the court applied what it saw as the "new standard
of heightened scrutiny. ' 79 According to the trial court, the law's car-
dinal defect was that it placed a disproportionate burden on a small
class of property owners, who were forced to subsidize a low-income
housing program.8° Moreover, the trial court was concerned that Lo-
cal Law No. 9 was not the least intrusive means of achieving the City's
goal of housing the homeless.8'
On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed.8 2 Disregarding Nol-
lan's heightened scrutiny requirement, the appellate panel found the
law constitutional because its provisions were not arbitrary or capri-
cious, 83 and cited to pre-Nollan cases upholding similar regulations
under a deferential standard of review.' The Appellate Division
flatly held that there cannot be a taking if an owner is not denied all
economically viable use of the property,85 thereby reading Agins' first
prong out of existence.
The Appellate Division endorsed the city's assertion that Local Law
No. 9 advanced a legitimate governmental purpose since the mea-
sure's goal was to provide shelter for the homeless.8 6 The court used
the Blackburn study,87 a massive research report that had been con-
ducted for the city as support for these goals. Unfortunately, the Ap-
pellate Division failed to analyze the actual findings of the Blackburn
study, in reaching its decision. When the case reached the Court of
Appeals, New York's highest Court, an amicus brief pointed out that
the Blackburn study itself established that Local Law No. 9 would do
little to resolve the plight of the homeless.88 Apparently, the ordi-
76. Id. at 1062.
77. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 523 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
78. Id. at 365.
79. Id. at 366.
80. Id. at 361.
81. Id.
82. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 534 N.Y.S.2d 958 (App. Div. 1988).
83. Id. at 968.
84. Id at 967.
85. Id. at 968.
86. Id. at 961, 966-68.
87. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1068 (N.Y.), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989) (citing Blackburn, Single Room Occupancy in New York
City (Jan. 1986)).
88. Id. (citing Blackburn Study at 5-6).
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nance was adopted primarily as a cost-saving measure, to achieve con-
trol over private resources without paying for them.89
The Court of Appeals struck down the ordinance, partly because of
this evidence that Local Law No. 9 did not actually advance its stated
goal.9° Over a stinging dissent by Judge Bellacosa, a 5-2 majority
found that "the nexus between the obligations placed on SRO prop-
erty owners and the alleviation of the highly complex social problem
of homelessness is indirect and conjectural." 91 Significantly, the Court
of Appeals expressly recognized and applied "semi-strict or height-
ened judicial scrutiny of regulatory means-ends relationships" as re-
quired by Nollan.92
The majority rejected the city's argument that a taking did not occur
because owners could avoid complying with the law by paying the
$45,000 per unit buyout fee. Referring to this provision as a "ran-
som," the Court of Appeals observed that "by equating the 'cure' with
dollars ... the terms of the Local Law No. 9 demonstrate that the
obligations placed on a few property owners are just the kind which
could, and should, be borne by the taxpayers as a whole. 93
In dissent, Judge Bellacosa asserted the perspective that regulations
of this kind had always been subjected to deferential review by New
York courts.94 Invoking the specter of Lochner,95 Judge Bellacosa
cautioned his colleagues against questioning the "wisdom or whole-
someness" of legislation.96 This lament may have marked the end of
an era of deference toward rental property regulations in New York.
89. Id. at 1069.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1068.
93. Id. at 1069.
94. Id. at 1072-74 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1072 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), a substantive due process case, is traditionally cited as an example of judicial
intrusion into the legitimate policy-making realm of the legislature. See, e.g., Cotton
Harness, Lucas and the Rebirth of Lochner, 2 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 57 (1992); Robert A.
Williams, Legal Discourse, Social Vision and the Supreme Court's Land Use Planning
Law: The Genealogy of the Lochnerian Recurrence in First Church and Nollan, 59 U.
COLO. L. REV. 427 (1988). For cogent counterarguments that courts in fact have a
duty to exercise strict judicial oversight to ensure the constitutional legitimacy of
property regulations, see, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE
CoNsrTTUrloN 318 (1980); Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Loch-
ner, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 627 (1988).
It should be noted that this entire debate is somewhat off the mark in the context of
regulatory takings decisions like Seawall and Nollan. The heightened standard of re-
view applied in these cases is grounded in the specific constitutional protections of the
Takings Clause, not in substantive due process. See R.S. Radford, Regulatory Takings
Law in the 1990's: The Death of Rent Control?, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1019, 1025 (1992).
96. Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1072 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
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B. Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital
In October 1994, the Court of Appeals applied the Supreme Court's
substantial advancement analysis to a provision of New York's Rent
Stabilization Act in Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital.9 7 The chal-
lenged enactment, chapter 940 of the Laws of 1984,98 known as the
Lenox Hill Law, required perpetual lease renewals for rent stabilized
apartments rented by nonprofit hospitals and subleased to members
of their staff.
The measure at issue had been sponsored and sheparded through
the New York legislature by Lenox Hill Hospital, a non-profit corpo-
ration that leases rent stabilized apartments as residences for its
nurses and other staff.99 The law required property owners to offer
annual lease renewals directly to Lenox Hill as their primary tenant,
rather than to the hospital employees who subleased the apart-
ments. 1°° Since Lenox Hill has a perpetual corporate existence, chap-
ter 940 had the effect of denying the apartment owners any
expectation of being able to reoccupy their property. Controlling a
bloc of rent stabilized housing gave Lenox Hill 'a major competitive
edge in hiring nurses and other personnel, although it obviously did
nothing to alleviate New York's housing shortage or accomplish any
other stated objective of rent control.
Now writing for the majority, Judge Bellacosa, who dissented in
Seawall, cited that decision, together with Nollan and Dolan, as estab-
lishing a "constitutional minimum floor of protection which this Court
lacks authority to diminish under the Supremacy Clause."''1 The
Court of Appeals held that chapter 940 effected a taking because it
"suffers a fatal defect by not substantially advancing a closely and
legitimately connected State interest" as required by Nollan and
Seawall.102
In concluding that chapter 940 effected a regulatory taking, the
Court of Appeals dealt with a wide range of arguments commonly
raised in support of rent control measures. For instance, the regula-
tors had argued that there can be no regulatory taking if the law as-
sures owners a "fair return" on their property.10 3 The Court of
Appeals rejected this contention, noting that "[t]he sharply focused
legal question under the controlling precedential and analytical princi-
97. 643 N.E.2d 479 (1994).
98. Id. at 480.
99. Id. at 481.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 482.
102. Id. at 480.
103. Id. at 486 (Chapter 940 permitted owners to increase their rents by 15% every
seven years).
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pies may be reduced simply to whether the legislation is supported by
a substantial State interest and close nexus."'0
The Court of Appeals also applied Dolan's shifting of the burden of
proof to counter the hoary notion that all legislative enactments are
entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. This generalized pre-
sumption, according to the Manocherian court, "cannot substitute for
the fundamental defect in chapter 940, to wit, no substantial advance-
ment of a legitimate State interest and 'close causal nexus' required
for the challenged regulatory enactment to survive scrutiny.' 0 5
IV. RECENT EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
As previously discussed, if rent control is to survive a regulatory
takings challenge under Nollan and Dolan, it must be proven that the
challenged measure substantially advances a legitimate state inter-
est.10 6 As the Seawall decision demonstrates, the mere existence of a
valid governmental objective is not sufficient to meet this standard.
Courts must employ heightened scrutiny to confirm that the ordinance
in question, as administered, substantially contributes to relieving
public problems related to rental housing. This is an empirical ques-
tion that cannot be answered by appeals to economic theory or polit-
ical ideology.107
The 1990 census provided a wealth of new data on the demographic
impact of rent control. The raw statistics, which became generally
available to researchers in 1992 and 1993, provide especially useful
information when compared with 1980 data for cities that adopted
rent control around the earlier date.10 8
The first comparative study of the 1980-1990 impact of rent control
was performed by a team of urban economists at St. John & Associ-
ates, a consulting firm in Berkeley, California.0 9 The St. John study
examines the effect of rent control over the decade of the 1980s in
Berkeley and Santa Monica"10 and compares the observed impact
with the stated objectives of these cities' rent regulations."' The re-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 487.
106. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987) (quoting
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
107. See, e.g., Jason W. Rose, Note, Forced Tenancies as Takings of Property in
Seawall Associates v. City of New York: Expanding on Loretto and Nollan, 40
DEPAUL L. REV. 245, 277 (1990) (the heightened scrutiny required by Nollan and
applied in Seawall "is important because it may require an actual statistical relation-
ship between means and ends, not just a logical or plausible relationship").
108. Rents in Berkeley have been controlled continuously since 1978; Santa
Monica's rent control law was adopted in 1979.
109. ST. JOHN & Assocs., RENT CONTROL IN PERSPECTIVE: IMPACTs ON CITIZENS
AND HOUSING IN BERKELEY AND SANTA MONICA TWELVE YEARS LATER (Aug.
1993) [hereinafter ST. JOHN STUDY].
110. Id. figs. 4.3.3(2)-(3).
111. Id. at 55.
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search methods of the St. John study were emulated the following
year by economist Rolf Goetze, who documented the effects of rent
control on housing in the Massachusetts cities of Cambridge and
Brookline." 2
The St. John and Goetze studies demonstrate that rent control on
both coasts of the United States has reduced the supply of affordable
housing and imposed harsh costs on the poor, minorities, the elderly,
and other vulnerable population groups. 1 3 The main beneficiaries
appear to have been young, middle class professionals, who have a
marked advantage in competing for the dwindling supply of rent con-
trolled housing." 4
A. Effects on the Housing Supply
Modern rent control ordinances routinely allege the existence of
"emergencies" in order to justify their adoption. The most commonly
cited emergency is a shortage of affordable rental housing. 1 5 The
need to mitigate the effects of a housing shortage has been accepted
by many courts as a legitimate state interest. 1 6 Under the deferential
due process standard, however, the judiciary has shown little interest
in determining whether such conditions actually existed." 7
Regardless of the authenticity of an alleged housing shortage, the
Supreme Court's current regulatory takings doctrine requires a show-
ing that rent control has helped mitigate the asserted emergency.
Many analysts have linked rent control to a decrease in the quality
and quantity of rental housing." 8 These findings are strongly sup-
112. ROLF GOETZE, RENT CONTROL: AFFORDABLE HOUSING FOR THE PRIVI-
LEGED, NOT THE POOR (1994) [hereinafter GOETZE STUDY].
113. ST. JOHN STUDY, supra note 109, at 80, 91; GOETZE STUDY, supra note 112, at
13-14.
114. ST. JOHN STUDY, supra note 109, tbl. 4.4.1 (1); GOETZE STUDY, supra note
112, at 14.
115. See MONICA R. LETT, RENT CONTROL: CONCEPTS, REALITIES, AND MECHA-
NISMS 35 (1976).
116. See, e.g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 566-67 (2d Cir. 1969); Birkenfeld v.
City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1024 (1976).
117. Although Berkeley's rent control ordinance rests on a "housing shortage" ra-
tionale, the city's housing supply was in fact expanding rapidly in the decade prior to
the imposition of controls. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR, U. OF CAL. AT
BERKELEY, HOUSING POLICY FOR THE 1980's 12 (Jan. 1981). Similarly, studies have
established that "there [was] no demand-induced rental housing crisis" in Los Ange-
les at the time rent control was adopted., W. Dennis Keating, Dispersion and Adapta-
tion: The California Experience, in THE RENT CONTROL DEBATE 57, 67-68 (Paul L.
Niebanck ed., 1985).
118. See, e.g., ROBERT ALBON & DAVID C. STAFFORD, RENT CONTROL 41-45
(1987); Monica Lett, supra note 111, at 44-48; 1 IRA S. LOWRY, NYC RAND INST.,
RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY: CONFRONTING THE CRISIS, RM-6190-NYC
(Feb. 1970); Frank S. Kristof, The Effects of Rent Control and Rent Stabilization in
New York City, in RENT CONTROL: MYTHS AND REALITIES 125, 136-37 (W. Block &
E. Olsen eds., 1981); C. Peter Rydell & Kevin Neels, Direct Effects of Un-
dermaintenance and Deterioration, in THE RENT CONTROL DEBATE 91, 96-99 (Paul L.
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ported by the recent empirical evidence presented by the St. John and
Goetze studies.
One of the most striking findings of the new research is that the rent
controlled cities of Berkeley and Santa Monica, and Brookline and
Cambridge, were virtually alone when compared with other cities in
their respective states, in losing rental housing during the 1980s. 119
While the regulated cities lost 8% to 14% of their rental housing
stock, comparable locales without rent control increased their supply
of rental units, typically by 5% to 20% over the decade.'12
Under any meaningful application of the Nollan and Dolan doc-
trines, advocates for rent control will be hard pressed to show that this
policy, which clearly reduces the supply of affordable rental housing,
substantially advances efforts to mitigate an affordable housing
shortage.
B. Distribution of Affordable Housing Under Rent Control
The relationship between rent control and housing shortages is not
only a question of the regulatory impact on aggregate supply. A siza-
ble body of research suggests that rent control not only reduces the
available stock of affordable housing, but also redistributes this dwin-
dling supply regressively within the population of renters.' 2 1
Niebanck ed., 1985); John C. Moorhouse, Optimal Housing Maintenance Under Rent
Control, 39 S. ECON. J. 93 (1972); Donald F. Vitaliano, The Short-Run Supply of
Housing Services Under Rent Control, 22 URB. STUD. 535, 535 (1985); Joseph
Gyourko & Peter Linneman, Rent Controls and Rental Housing Quality: A Note on
the Effects of New York City's Old Controls, 27 J. URB. ECON. 398, 408-09 (1990);
Richard J. Devine, Who Benefits from Rent Control? 59-70 (unpublished report of
Center for Community Change 1987).
119. ST. JOHN STUDY, supra note 109, at 55; GOETZE STUDY, supra note 112, at 7.
120. ST. JOHN STUDY, supra note 109, at 55, figs. 4.3.3 (1)-(4); GOETZE STUDY,
supra note 112, at 7, fig. 4.
121. Recent studies have found that the largest financial benefits of rent control
accrue to renters in the most exclusive neighborhoods. See John C. Moorhouse, Long-
Term Rent Control and Tenant Subsidies, 27 Q. Rev. Econ. & Bus. 21 (1987); Peter
Salins & Gerard Mildner, Does Rent Control Help the Poor?, NY: The City J. 39, 41(Winter 1991) (citing 1989 research at Harvard's Joint Center for Housing Studies).
See also, U.S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Report on the New
York City Loan Program, S. Rep. No. 900, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976) ("[T]here is
no evidence to show that rent control benefits the poor. Quite the contrary, it helps a
small, privileged group of long-time residents, largely middle class .... "); ARTH4UR D.
LITTLE, INC., NEW YORK: How WELL IS IT HOUSED? Executive Summary at ES-6
(1986) (rent control transfers 12.5 times more wealth to upper-income New Yorkers
than to the elderly poor); Paul L. Niebanck, The Politics and Economics of Rent Con-
trol, in THE RENT CONTROL DEBATE 3, 4 (Paul L. Niebanck ed., 1985) (in Fort Lee,
New Jersey, the income of the typical beneficiary of rent control was found to be in
the top 5% of the state). Even research funded by the Santa Monica Rent Control
Board confirms that the largest subsidies from rent control accrue to occupants of the
city's most expensive rental units. Levine et al., Who Benefits from Rent Control?, 56
Am. PLAN. ASS'N. J. 140, 144 (1990).
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In California, rent control has tended to be adopted in cities with
relatively wealthy electorates.'22 The demographic evidence has
never supported the claim that rent control was adopted in these cities
to ease the burdens of the poor. Instead, as Devine and others have
demonstrated, "the major beneficiary of regulatory controls in each
case was (and still is) a population that is firmly entrenched in the
middle class."' 23
The Goetze and St. John studies confirm that the dwindling number
of rent controlled apartments in California and Massachusetts has
been parcelled out to a younger, wealthier, more upscale group of
renters. Due to the reduced availability of affordable housing under
rent control, the number of low-income and very low-income renter
households living in Berkeley decreased by more than 2,000 between
1980 and 1990. The same decade saw rapid growth in the poverty-
level population of the San Francisco Bay Area and California as a
whole. 124
During the rent-controlled decade of the 1980s, Santa Monica ex-
perienced a loss of 775 low-income renter households, a decrease of
nearly 12%.125 The city also lost 285 very low-income renter house-
holds over this time.' 26 Concurrent with this exodus of economically
disadvantaged renters, Santa Monica experienced a 40% rise in the
number of households with very high incomes. 127 During this same
period, Los Angeles County (which includes Santa Monica) saw an
influx of 60,000 poor renter households. 28
In Massachusetts, the rent controlled cities of Cambridge and
Brookline lost 10% and 26%, respectively, of their poverty-level
households during the 1980s. 1 29 By the end of this period, the per
capita income of occupants of rent controlled apartments in Cam-
bridge was higher than that in the uncontrolled sector.130
In addition to displacing the poor, rent control in California had a
devastating impact on the population of elderly renters and students.
Under rent control in the 1980s, it was virtually impossible for the
122. Beverly Hills' per capita income is 184% above the California average.
COUNTY & CITY DATA BOOK, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 604 (1988) [hereinafter
COUNTY & CiTY DATA BOOK]. The city adopted rent control in 1979. Palm Springs'
per capita income is 35% above the California average. CoUNTY & Crr' DATA BOOK
at 620. The city adopted rent control in 1980. The cities of Berkeley and Santa
Monica, which imposed rent control in the late 1970s, are notable for their concentra-
tions of upscale young professionals, well above the California average in education
and income. See, e.g., Devine, supra note 114, at 16-18.
123. Devine, supra note 114, at 26.
124. ST. JOHN STUDY, supra note 109, at tbl. 4.4.1 (1).
125. Id. at 80.
126. Id.
127. Id. at tbl. 4.4.1 (3).
128. Id at tbl. 4.4.1 (2).
129. GOETZE STUDY, supra note 112, at 13-14.
130. Id. at 14.
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elderly to obtain rental housing in Berkeley. Meanwhile, existing eld-
erly residents who died or moved away were replaced by younger,
wealthier renters. As a result, over the decade of the 1980s, the eld-
erly population of Berkeley increased by less than 1%-less than
would be accounted for by the natural aging of the pre-rent-control
population-compared with an increase of nearly 25% in the Bay
Area. 131
The effect in Santa Monica was even more remarkable. Despite a
15% increase in the elderly population of Los Angeles County in the
1980s, there was actually a drop in the number of elderly Santa
Monica residents under rent control. 132
During the decade of the 1980s, the number of Californians en-
rolled in college jumped dramatically. In Alameda County, college
students accounted for 10.3% of the population in 1990, up from 8.9%
ten years before. 33 Yet, the number of college students able to find
housing in Berkeley, home of the flagship campus of the University of
California ("U.C.B."), actually fell during this decade of rent con-
trol. 34 According to the university's figures, the number of U.C.B.
students able to find housing in Berkeley fell by more than 1500.
Conversely, the number of U.C.B. students living in neighboring com-
munities outside Berkeley rose by more than 2000 over the same pe-
riod. This exodus has occurred despite an increase in the number of
dormitory rooms provided in Berkeley by the university itself. 35
Similar results occurred in Santa Monica, although the numbers are
not as dramatic because Santa Monica is not home to a major univer-
sity. Even so, it is clear that college students find it more difficult to
find housing in Santa Monica today than they did before rent control,
relative to any comparably sized community in Southern California. 136
During the 1980's, Santa Monica and Berkeley were virtually alone
among comparable California cities in experiencing losses in rental
housing and decreases in these especially vulnerable population
groups. What makes this especially ironic is that students, the poor,
and the elderly have been singled out for favored treatment by the
official housing policies of both Berkeley and Santa Monica. As an
empirical matter, it seems clear that the actual effects of rent control
have run strongly contrary to the stated intentions of the policy
makers.
Incredibly, in both California and Massachusetts, rent control in the
1980s was a powerful engine for uprooting the poor, the elderly, stu-
dents, and other vulnerable population groups and forcing them to
131. ST. JOHN STUDY, supra note 109, at 91.
132. Id.
133. Id. at fig. 4.4.3 (3).
134. Id at 86.
135. See id. at 86-87.
136. Id at figs. 3.4.3 (4)-(6).
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relocate elsewhere. Advocates of regulation may claim that these
consequences were not intended when rent control was adopted.137
However, after more than a decade of evidence to the contrary, it can
no longer be credibly argued that rent control substantially advances
the interests of disadvantaged groups. Ultimately these groups bear
the heaviest burdens of rent control regulations.
CONCLUSION
Since 1987, the Supreme Court has greatly strengthened its protec-
tion of the rights of property owners under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The government now bears the burden of proving,
under a heightened standard of review, that property regulations sub-
stantially advance legitimate state interests.
The constitutionality of rent control has never been upheld under
the Supreme Court's tough new regulatory takings doctrine. In what
may be the start of a trend, the New York State Court of Appeals has
twice struck down rental property regulations for failing the substan-
tial advancement test set forth in Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission and Dolan v. City of Tigard.
Recent empirical studies of rent control in California and Massa-
chusetts have established that these regulations have caused a reduc-
tion in the supply of affordable rental housing. Moreover, the
dwindling supply of rent controlled units has been allocated to a rela-
tively wealthy, young, upscale population of renters. In contrast, the
costs of regulation have been concentrated on the poor, students, the
elderly, and other groups typically identified as the intended benefi-
ciaries of such regulations.
Since the effects of rent control have been shown to run strongly
counter to its stated intentions, these ordinances are highly vulnerable
to a constitutional attack under the Supreme Court's regulatory tak-
ings doctrine. Consequently, rent control laws that cannot be shown
to substantially advance legitimate state interests will not survive con-
stitutional scrutiny under the criteria set forth by the Supreme Court
in Nollan and Dolan.
137. Despite such protestations, overt discrimination cannot be ruled out as a mo-
tive for rent control. See THOMAS W. HAZLETr, U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS:
ISSUES IN HOUSING DISCRIMINATION, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION IN RENT CON-
TROLLED MARKETS (Nov. 1985).
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